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Abstract 
A又I.!nda }, I is the \'olll l1l inOllS policy düc lIment th司 t emanated from the 1992 United Nati0ns 
Conl~rence on [nvironment and De、 elopmen t. Lsing a brief case study of China's en~rg: 
lIse- specitìcally its lIse of coal- this article illu strate州o\\' the objectives of Agenda 21 me 
re f1 cctcd in China's cconomic d叭 elop l1lent policics and practices , \Ve address thesc kìnd s of 
questions . Has China endea\'()ured to impkment (，II\ ' irο11月lentally sustainah!e development ‘ 
as rencctcd in t lJe chaptèrs of Agenda 2 J? Wh糾正!oc s the case of energy use tell us about the 
lI tilily of Agend J. 2 J ohjecti\'es in China and other dC \'l,: loping countries? \Vhat are some of 
the political and economic Ülctors that in f1l1cnccd this process? More broadly, what docs thc 
Chincs~ case tell us about thc impkmentation 0 1' \'olllntary international environmcntal 
agreements il1 the de\'cloping 叭。rld? V/e conclud心 that China has been stimulated by Agcnda 
21 :lIld othcr intcrnatiollal instrllments 、 along \\ith othèr factors . to shift its ccono l11 ic 
c1 e\-e!op l11 cnt to\\'ard a 111 0\'(' (，!l\ ' ironmcntall:- 日lI stainabk trajectory. as re f1 ected in its 
changing policies 011 cnergy dcri 丸 ed Jì'om coal bllrnìng , Howevel\bccause economic gro\\1h 
r巳mains ccnt t'a l 1O ck \'C lopmcnt 巴oal趴 thcse policiö are 0111;- a stmt to\\'arcl environmc l1 tall~ 
stlstainabk d ,,' \'clopmcJlt. En \'ironmcntal dcclinc ;;t ill olltpaces sllstainabk dc\'elopment 
Introduction 
When politicians, economists and diplomats talk about China they express concern about 
~' t 
Asian security, economics and trade, and human rights. But they also now routinely invoke 
the potential for econom i<: development in China to do great harm to the natural environnlènt 
of East Asia and indeed the entire globe. They also express concern about environnlent-
related impacts on the health ofthe Chinese people and their economy. Because ofthe 
potentially adverse environmental consequences of Chinese development, one observer has 
described China as an "environmental bombshell" viaiting to explode.2 Many people think the 
best way for the Chinese "bombshell" to be defused is through enνironmentally sustainable 
economic development. Here we define "sustainable development" as economic development 
in harmony with the environment, or more realistically development that balances economic 
and environmental goals and thereby does Iimited harm to the environment. The notion of 
sustainable development was codified in Agenda 訓， the voluminous policy document that 
emanated from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED , meeting at the "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro). Agenda 21 offers guidelines that 
China can use to move its de\'elopment path toward greater envirorunental sustainability.J 
Sustainable development is now perceived to be an important issue in China. lt gained 
support in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1 996-2000), and the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party 
Congress (September 1997) stated that sustainable dcvelopment strategies must be 
implemented.4 This sentiment \\'a5 subsequently reiterated by goverrunent officials at aIl 
Ic丸'els ， including the premier and the president, and has been reflected in policy changes 
designecl to actualise sustainable development.5 To be sure , China has experienced 
monumental environmcntal problems associated with its rapid economic gro\\-1h. Among the 
l110re pWlllinent environmental problems fíJ cing China are rapid depletion ofland through 
CO I1 \εrsio l1 0 1' agriculturíJ! bnd (0 cO ll1l1lercial l1 ses ‘ poll l1 tion of a11 kinds ‘ notably \\-ater 
'可
po l1l1tion from industrialization and popu1ation growth. and air polllltion from automobi1es 
and the burning of coa1; degradation of soi1 , forests and grasslands; increased soil erosion; 
and the general adverse and broad ímpacts ofthe world's largest population.6 In the long 
term, these adverse environmental consequences of economìc growth wilI pose tremendous 
challenges for China's economic development, political stability, and the hea1th ofthe 
youngest generation in China (not to mentíon the well being ofthose living in other countries, 
and that of other species). The Chinese govemrnent has taken notice 
Our objective in this article is to use a brief case study of China's energy use-
specifically its use of coal-to illustrate and understand ho\\" the 0句ectives of Agenda 21 are 
reflected in China's economic dèvelopment. We begin asking these kinds of questions: Has 
China endeavoured to implement sllstainable development.的 reflected in the chapters of 
Agenda 21 ? What does the case of energy use tell us about the utility of Agenda 21 
objectives in China and perhaps other developing countries: What are some ofthe political 
and economic factors that influenced this process? More broadly, ，、'hat does the Chinese case 
tell us about the implementation of voluntary intemational environmental agreements in the 
developing \Vorld? 
After further explanation of our research. in the next part of this article we say more 
about the notion of sustainable developme叭， and we discuss some ofthe objectives of 
Agènda 2 1. We then look directly at the degree to which economic development in China has 
re f1 ected the objectives of several important parts of Agenda 21 , using Chinese coal 
production and use as an indicative case. We conclude with observations about what the case 
of China tells us about the implementation of Agenda 21 and voluntary international 
envÍronmental aQreements 
、d
Why h~\ 'e we cbosen the China case? 011ξcan tìnd many justífications, but chief 
Rmon芒 them is Cbina's size and potential impact on th c' natural environment. Like other 
developing countries, it justifiably seeks to improve the living standards of its people 
However, should this be done in an environmentally unsustainable manner-as it has been so 
far, for the most p缸t-the adverse impacts will be felt not only locally and nationally, but 
regionally and globally. China already has some ofthe most polluted cities in the world, but 
soon it will overtake the United States as the primary source ofpolluting emissions that 
contribute to global climate change. The sources of air pollution in Beijing and Shanghai 紅院
consequently , also sources of climate change in Sao Paulo and Dhaka (and New York and 
London). Thus a better understanding of the Chinese case could have substantial benefits for 
countless people in China and beyond. Furthermore, China can be viewed 臼 indicative of 
large developing countries that are trying to promote sustainable development-that is, 
countries seeking to balance long term environmental protection with short and medium term 
economic growth and development 
To be sure, one case is not enough to make sweeping generalizations about 
sustainable development, Agenda 21 , and the implementation of other voluntary international 
environmental agreements. However, the Chinese case goes a long way toward these ends 
Added to the research already done in this field , this brief case study can therefore be 
enlightening 
Sustainable Development and Agenda 21 
International Eoviroomental Diplomacy and Sustainable Developmeot 
Environmental issues emerged on the international agenda with the 1972 Stockholrn 
Conference on the Hllman Environment. The govenunents of 114 countries agreed that their 
environmental fortunes were interconnected, and that they shared a single global commons 
Among the important products ofthe Stockholm conference were the Stockholm Declaration, 
4 
the establishment ofthe United Nations Environment Program 肛肘EP)， and the surrounding 
attention 也at contributed to creation of domestic envirorunental protection ministries. 7 明也ile
出e conference was largely devoted to environmental matters, reflecting the preferences of the 
industrialized developed countries, it also brought attention to questions of economic 
development that would be even more salient in future intemational environmental 
conferences. The Stockholm Declaration was a set of sometimes conflicting principles, some 
reasserting sovereignty, others highlighting the need to compromise it to de叫 effectively wi也
environmental issues. UNEP soon encountered resistance 岳om developed countri郎， which 
wanted to avoid paying for new environmental programs abroad, and from developing 
countries, which feared that environmental concems would divert attention away from 
economic development. Other UN institutions also resisted making UNEP a strong body 
within the United Nations. They did not want to cede their own new environment-related 
programs to UNEP.8 Thus the Stockholrn conference initially had little favourable impact on 
the Earth's environment. Nevertheless, the Stockholm conference raised awareness among 
publics and governments about the importance of intemational emironmental cooperation, 
and UNEP would eventually take on an important role in intemational enviroIimental 
deliberations.9 
Twenty ye缸s after the Stockholm conference, diplomats 企om nearly 180 còuntries 
attended the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environrnent and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, making it the largest international conference to that date. Indeed, 118 heads öfstate 
or government spoke at this "Earth Surnmit," reflecting the growing intemational interest in 
environmental issues since Stockholm. Among the products ofthe Rio sUIìlmit were the Rio 
Declaration, a statement of principles that governments agreed to consider as p缸t of efforts to 
foster environmentally sustainable development; aσreement on conventions dealing with 
climate change and biodiversity; establishment of a UN Commission on Sustainable 
5 
Development (CSD), which was intended to promote sustainable development across the UN 
system and to foster international funding of related programs; a weak statement on 
protecting and managing the world's forests; and Agenda 21. 10 Perrneating UNCED and its 
declarations was the demand by developing countries that "new and additiona1" funds be 
provided by the developed countries for the pu中oses of environmentally sustainable 
development 
Whether the Rio surnmit was a success was the focus of "Earth Summit II ," held in 
New York in 1997. It was agreed that UNCED was somewhat successful in giving new 
energy to the goals of the Stockholm conference, and 出at it provided important guidance for 
environmental programs and stimulated ongoing negotiations on specific important issues 
like climate change. But new action on protecting the global environment was incrementa1 at 
best, and the commitment by developed countries to provide new aid to the developing world 
went unfulfilled. Diplomats and environmentalists realized that environmental protection 
would be a slow, ongoing process. 11 What emanated from Stockholm and Rio was a genera1 
agreement among governments that a move toward sustainable development was needed, and 
that it ought to begin sooner rather than later. But, despite two decades of discussions, this 
still begged the question ofwhat sustainable development would entail 
Probably the most authoritative-and certainly 出e most frequently cited-definition 
of sustainable development comes from the 1987 report of the Brundtland Comrnission (the 
WorId Commission on Environment and Development), Dur Common Future. This report's 
definition served as the basis for UN plans for UNCED and associated statements and 
agreements , including Agenda 21. According to that repo此， sustainable development is 
"development which meets the needs ofthe present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet theír o\Vn needs." 12 The precise meaning of sustainab1e 
6 
development will always vary, depending on the issue and the actors involved. We can say, 
however，也at sustainable development encompasses several important areas: 
First, the concept clearly represents an a即mpt to bridge the concems and interests of 
developed and developing nations, but it applies to both. . .. Second, it a悅mpts to 
reconcile economic growth and environrnental protection, rather than viewing them 位
tradeoffs; indeed, the Brundtland Report argues that neither is possible without the 
「
other. Third, the concept is strongly anthropocentric. It starts from the premise 甘lllt
human needs must be met in order to address environmental problems. Thus 
improvement in living conditions in poor countries . . . is an essential precondition for 
ecological preservation. Fourth, the limits to growth are not ultimately physical or 
biological but social and technological; it is assurned 也at environmental problems can 
be solved. F.inally, the concept is extremely general, lacking in specific content as to 
how sustainable development is to be attained or who is responsible for achieving it. 
This vagueness was deliberate; it allows the idea to be adopted by virtually everyone 
as a way of bringing people together to seek cornmon ground. In this formulation it is 
clearly a political and social construct, not a scientific concept or blueprint. 13 
Agenda 21 
Which among these foci of sustainable development is most importarIt is no doubt subject to 
differing views, including within China. It is essential to realize that all of Agenda 21 is a 
result of political bargaining during international deliberations. As such, its chapters and 
paragraphs are open to multiple interpretations, just like the underlying concept of sustainable 
development. It would be wrong to assume that each government's definition of "sustainable 
development" is the same. In areas most affected by pollution, environmental considerations 
7 
may be foremost; in areas suffering more poverty, development willlikely be the dominant 
consideration. In some instances sustainability, in the environmental sense, will be the 
primary goal; in others, it will be seen as a meαns to economic growth and assistance from 
central authorities or intemational institutions. lndeed, even within countries, not least one 
the size and complexity ofChina, meanings ofthe tenn and its practica1 implications will 
vary. Important1 y, Agenda 21 is not a binding agreement. It is a set of recommendations onl y. 
This begs the question of why govemments would implement Agenda 21. Self-
interest is the obvious explanation. In this case China can benefit from invoking technology 
assistance and fmancial aid arrangements outlined in Agenda 21 (which are more concretely 
codified in intemational environmental treaties, such as the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change). But this does not explain everything. Governments are also interested in 
doing, or being seen as doirig, the "right" thing 企om the perspective of the intemational 
community. While compliance wi出 intemational environmenta1 treaties is expected and quite 
often forthcoming , even voluntary intemational agreements can inf1uence state behavior by 
gradually reshaping conceptions of national interests in line with emergent intemational 
14 
norrns 
Agenda 21 is broken down into four main sections (comprising 40 chapters): Social 
and Economic Dimensions, Conservation and Management of Resources for Development, 
Strengthening the Role ofMajor Groups, and Means oflmplementation. It includes 
something for almost eve可one. What comes through from a reading of Agenda 21 is the goal 
of achieving sustainable development, or more directly promoting economic development 
(usually meaning economic growth) without unnecessa可 and excessive harrn to the 
environment. For better or worse, Agenda 21 is concemed most of all with the well-being of 
people (not animals, plants and the ecosystem per se). The natural environment is valuable, in 
this interpretation, because it benefits humans. Explicit is the need to reduce poverty and raise 
8 
living standards in the poor countries. This is to be done through fostering an international 
trading system favourable to developing ∞凹的es， through greater intemational assistance in 
the forms of fmancing and technology, and through national plans, stàltegies and policies. 15 
As Bryner has argued, sustainable development "requires the creation of new incentives and 
penalties 由at promote sustainable activity; revising national economicindicators to re f1ect 
environmental considerations; reforms that ensure that market prìces include more of the true 
costs of production; and addressing the problem of falling commodity prices 也叫 encourages
developing coun仕ies to export natural resources at unsustainable rates." 16 These goals are laid 
out in Agenda 21. 
We examine several ofthese areas below, using the case of coal use in China as an b 
indicative case study of their implementation (or not). It is not possible here to survey the 
ways in which all Agenda 21 chapters and objectives are reflected in China's development 
policies. Here we focus on portions of three chapters dealing with industrial economics and 
甘ade (Chapter 2), atmospheric pollution (Chapter 9), and fmancing considerations (Chapter 
33). This sampling of Agenda 21 chapters provides a cross-section of important areas and 
sectors that must be considered in the context of implementing sustainable development on 
the ground. 
Domestic Policïes Re/ated to Sustainαble Deve/opment 
Chapter 2 of Agenda 21 addresses international cooperation to accelerate sustainable 
development in developing countries, and related domestic policies. 17 Hence it tries to make 
the essential connections between international deliberations and interstate cooperation, on 
the one hand, and sustainable development on the ground in developing countries, on the 
other. Chapter 2 begins by focusing on creation of an international economic climate 
favourable to countries undergoing development (in many ways ignoring envÏronmentaI 
9 
issues) . The main concem of the chapter is promotion of sustainable development through 
trade. It brings toge出er international and national e叮orts ， pointing out that "reactivation and 
4 
acceleratìon of development requires both a dynamic and a supportive intemational economic 
environment and determined policies at the nationallevel. It will be frustrated in the absence 
of either ofthese requirements. ,, 18 Here we focus on the portions ofChapte~ 2 dedicated to 
management-related activities that maximize the benefits oftrade liberalization for 
sustainable development (para. 2.14[c]) and 由at encourage domestic policies conducive to 
sustainable development (para. 2.37[月)， in particular market-based pricing of commodities 
Much of Chapter 2 is dedicated to specific policy mechanisms. According to 
Paragraph 2.14( c), countries should adopt, "with respect to commodities consistent with 
market efficiency," policies that "reflect efficient and sustainable use offactors ofproduction 
in the formation of commodity prices, including the reflection of environmental, social and 
resources costs." More specificaI1y, according to Chapter 2, 
all countries should develop policies that improve efficiency in the allocation of 
reso盯ces and take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the changing global 
economic environmen t. In particular, wherever appropriate, and taking into account 
national strategiesωld objectives, countries should: 19 
Remove the barriers to progress caused by bureaucratic inefficiencies, administrative 
strains, unnecessary controls and the neglect of market conditions;20 
Provide scope for appropriate economic instrumen俗， including market mechanisms , 
in harmony with the objectives of sustainable development and fulfilment of basic 
> 21
neeos; 
10 
Promote the operation of effective tax systems and financial sectors.22 
1n other words, the prices of goods and services should reflect their true costs to the 
enviro凹的肘， to society, and to the coun旬r's resource base. More specifically, these 
paragraphs arguably mean th剖 the prices of commodities should not be reduced by 
government subsidies, but instead should be determined by the market. Yet in so m個y
countries-both developed and developing, China included-the prices of goods and servic-es 
frequently do not reflect their real costs to society and to the natural environment. For 
example, coal, water and wood would be much higher in price in China were their true costs 
reflected. (Again, the same can be said for developed countries. They are not the focus of our 
analysis, however.) 
Atmo亮pheric and Air Pollution 
1n Chapter 9, Agenda 21 focuses on protection ofthe atmosphere, which is threatened by a 
myriad of pollutants from countless sources戶 Chapter 9 recommends actions related to 
transportation, industrial development, terrestrial and marine resource development and land 
use, stratospheric ozone depletion, and transboundary atmospheric poIlution?4 There is 
recognition that atmosphe丘c poIlution is first a problem of economics, and specifically of 
energy and resource use. Below we examine ways in which Agenda 21 paragraphs dealing 
with energy (coal) developme帥， efficiency and consumption are actualized (intentionally or 
not) in China. 
Energy use is essential to development, as the paragraphs in Chapter 9 acknowledge. 
However, much energy worldwide "is currently produced and consumed in ways that could 
not be sustained iftechnology were to remain constant and if overal1 quantities were to 
11 
increase substantially. ,, 25 Agenda 21 recognizes the "need to control atmospheric emissions of 
greenhouse and other gases, and substances wiU increasingly need to be based 011 efficiency 
.,. 
in energy" use and increased reliance on new energy sources, with all energy necessarily used 
in ways that "respect the atmosphere, human health and the environment as a whole. ,, 26 But 
global energy use is growing, particularly in many developing countries. lndeed, in China 
energy use is having the adverse local, regional and globa1 impacts anticipated by Agenda 21 , 
and within a generation China is likely to overtake the United States as the world's largest 
energy user (in aggregate, not per capita).27 
Financial Resources and lvfechanisms 
Chapter 33 of Agenda 21 addresses the important capacity-building issue of fmancial 
resources and mechanisms?8 This was one ofthe most contentious issues in the UNCED 
negotiations, salting open wounds from the developing countries' failed attempts in previous 
decades to create a New International Economic Order and to compel more development 
funding 企om North to South. However, demonstrating the inf1uence of developing countries 
in the environmental issue area, Chapter 33 is permeated with calls for "new and additional" 
(sometimes written as "substantially new and additional") financial resources and technology, 
specifically to be provided on highly concessional terrns or as grants by developed countries 
to the developing countries戶 This new and additional funding for Agenda 21 and other 
UNCED programs was expected to come from multilateral development banks (including the 
lnternational Development Association and the newly established Global Environmental 
Facility), specialized agencies ofthe United Nations and other international organizations and 
multilateral institutions, bilateral assistance programs, debt relief, and private funding叩 New
forms of public and private financing were also to be explored, including, for example, 
tradable permits.31 
12 
While Agenda 21 acknowledges that financing will come from each country's public 
and private sectors, Chapter 33 cal1s on the developed countries to increase 也eir official 
development assistance (ODA):32 
For developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, ODA is a main 
source of external funding, and substantial new and additional funding for sustainable 
development and implementation of Agenda 21 will be required. Developed countries 
reaffirm their commitments to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7 per cent 
of GNP for ODA and, to the extent that they have not yet achieved 也at target, agree 
to augment their aid prograrnmes in order to reach that target as soon 臼 possible and 
to ensure prompt and effective implementation of Agenda 訂戶
It was agreed 也at the new Commission on Sustainable Development would monitor progress 
toward 也is goal. \\也ile all of Agenda 21 is, again, voluntary, this call for new funds 祖d
concessional technology transfe時， as well 自由e reaffirrnation ofthe 0.7 percent ODA target, 
was a victory for developing countries, arguably reflecting their newfound power in the 
context of growing concern in the developed countries about adverse environmental changes 
from unsustainable development in developing countries戶 Explicit throughout Agenda 21 , 
and indeed the intemational negotiations on it and related matters, was the understanding that 
developing countries would not, and 缸guably could not, make a full transition to 
sustainability if new funds and technology assistance were not forthcoming. Insofar 也 ODA
has not come into line with the UN target-indeed, it fell far short, dropping through the 
1990s-the likelihood of more sustainable development is reduced. This shortfalI was 
replaced by private investment in some countries, much of it directed at China (but very little 
has gone to the poorest coun出的 that arguably need it the most). 
13 
Economic Developmeot io Chioa and the Objectives of Agenda 21: The Case of Coal 
Since Agenda 21 was agreed by intemational consensus in 1992, China has paid much more 
attention to environrnental conservation and sustainable development, even while prioritising 
economic growth. China has experienced rapid economic growth and significant positive 
developments for the environrnent. However, many serious environrnental problems remain 
unsolved, and overall environmental conditions continue to deteriorate rapidly. In this 
section, we focus on the problem of air pollution in China (one of its most pressing 
environrnental concems). We wiU argue, mainly from an economic viewpoint, that China's 
coaI pricing policy is important for its sustainable development. We wiIl also look at how 
indicative Agenda 21 is for China's coaI pricing policy. We look first at China's economic 
development strategy after the advent of Agenda 21 ，但 well as related unsolved problems 
(e.g. , future coaI shortages and sulphur dioxide emissions). We then look at measures 曲的
could be taken (iιchanges to coal pricing policy) and the obstacles to implementing these 
measures. We focus on the three chapters of Agenda 21 described above, asking specificaIly 
how they might apply to China's coal pricing policy. In our subsequent conclusion we point 
out that while Agenda 21 has its limitations, it does indeed provide indicative guid叩ce for 
China-and arguably other developing countries一-to implement sustainable development. 
lnternatìonal Action 00 Sustainable Development and China's Agenda 21 
Though China already took steps for sustainable development, a丘er agreement on Agenda 21 
it carried out more environmental conservation, while putting a priority on economic growth. 
Agenda 訓， and the outside actors and intemational negotiations shaping it and cJosely related 
environmental agreements, have inf1u.enced China's policies and practices on sustainable 
development. Elizabeth Economy has shown that "intemational actors have had a significant 
14 
inf1uence in shaping Chinese domestic environmental politics and foreign relations. The 
demands of participating in global environmental regirnes have forced Chinese leaders to 
establish new domestic institutions and processes for rnanaging their participation in those 
regirnes. Most important, these new institutions and processes favour the interests of the 
environmentally proactive actors within China by radically reconfiguring the very nature of 
PRC environmental politics."J5 As Lester Ross argues, "International pressure on the PRC to 
conforrn its conduct to international environmental norms influences dornestic policy making 
in support of environmental regulation,"J6 and Yu-shi Mao has observed that international 
envÎronmental agreements, "regardless of whether China has signed up to thern or not, are a 
significant force in promoting environmental protection in China. ,,37 More broadly, the 
Chinese government wants to show the world cares about environmental issues, notably by 
taking voluntary action to curb the use of energy con仕ibuting to climate change, thereby 
reinforcing its "clairn and self-perception as a m吋or player in world politics and to be the 
leader of and speaker for developing countries."JS 
Thus, in the period surrounding the 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED) from which 
Agenda 21 emerged, China created many new agencies and promulgated new programs and 
regulations geared toward environmental protection戶 According to Economy, "lJNCED had 
a profound effect on envirorunental policies, institutions, and thinking in the PRC. In terms of 
actual policy change, the most important result ofthe UNCED was the formation of a 
Chinese action plan to implement a policy of sustainable development."40 Within the space of 
one year China created its own Agenda 21 , which was based on one emanating from the 
Earth Summit-;-the first country to do so. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that the 
influence of Agenda 21 and associated international deliberations were unable to counter all 
of the bureaucratic, political and economic forces in China pushing against more robust 
implementation of sustainable development. Hence, while "international negotiations have 
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induced some remarkable adjustments of Chinese institutions" in this issue area,41 and 
China's policies and actions are more sustainable than they would be, they are far from what 
is necess訂Y to protect the environment 
.. p 
China's Agenda 21 was completed in April 1993. In March 1994 the Chinese State 
Council adopted 
Envirorunent and Development in the 21 st Centu句" (China's Agenda 21). The coverage of 
China's Agenda 21 is wide: legislation, policies, education, agricu1ture, environment, energy, 
transportation, regional development, population, health, and their mutual relation to one 
another. The main themes ofthis agenda arose first from the need foreconomic development, 
and then from concerns about protecting the environment for sustainable development. The 
following statement explains: 
Because China is a developing country, the goals ofincreasing social 
productivity, enhancing overall national strength and improving people's quality 
of life cannot be realized without giving primacy to the development of the 
national economy and having all work focused on building the economy. . . 
Given this siωation， the Chinese Government can only consider strategies for 
development that are sustainable and only by coordinating the work of all 
segments of society can it successfully reach its already defined second and 
third strategic objectives of quadrupling its GNP against 出at of 1980 by the end 
the centu可 and increasing per capita GNP to the levels of moderately developed 
countries. At the same time, it will be necessary to conserve natural resources 
and to improve the environment, so that the country will see long-term, stable 
development. 42 
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Regarding the environment, China has improved its regulatory practices. For example in the 
area of air qtiality control, in 1995 the Air polIution Prevention and Control Law (frrst 
promulgated in 1987), was amended to include tougher regulations for controlling sulphur 
dioxide 
China has received substantial international aid and loans for environmental 
protection projects. lndeed, four-fifths of its budget for envirorunental protection comes for 
international aidρSince 1992, China has been the largest borrower from the World Bank, 
and in the past several ye缸s lending for environmental protection has become the fastest 
growth area ofthe World Bank's programs in China.44 China is also the largest borrower 企om
the Asian Development Bank.45 As for bilateral aid, for China the larg己st bilateral donor is 
Japan. The Japanese government's concessionalloans were, in the past, mainly for 
transportation projects. Since 1995 however, loans for environment-related projects (i .e., 
environmental conservation, sewerage and cleaner power plants) have become the primary 
objects of aid (Figure 1 ) .46 
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Figure 1: The Japanese Government's Offical Development 
Assistant Loans to China by Sector 
0% 20% 
團 Electric power & Gas 
白 Commodity loans 
• Environment 
口 Agriculture
口 Telecommunications
40% 60% 80% 
口 Transport
口 Social services excl. Environment 
曰 MiningIManufacturing
回 lrrigation
Note: The data and loan amounts are at the approval base, which may differ from the disbursement 
base. Some loans for environment-related projects are categorised into sectors other than 
Environmen t. For example, loans for c1eaner power plants fall into Electric power 
Source: Edited by the authors with data from Japan 8ank for International Cooperation, "Economic 
Cooperation: ODA P吋ect Data," available from http ://帆'IW.jbic.go.jp/engl ish/oec/pro jectl 
index.php, accessed 5 June 2002 
Energy Use in China: Dirty Coal 
These and many other recent eff0l1s by China have been somewhat positive for 
environmental1y sustainable development. As for economic growth, China is among the 
world's five fastest growing economies. Rising incomes have eased poverty and improved 
health in large parts ofthe country. As for air pollution, some cities have seen ambient air 
quality improvements. Particulate emissions have remained relatively f1at since 1980, 
implying a substantial increase in controls given the near doubling of coal consumption.47 
However, substantial problems remain for sustuinable development. Concerning economic 
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growth, coal shortages will pose challenges. Regarding pollution, sulphur dioxide emissions 
and the resulting acid rain remain major problems. 
China's is an energy-scare economy，叫出 per capita coal endowments far below the 
worJd average (TabJe 1)叫
Table 1: Coal Endowments 
China us ~ussia World 
Proved recoverable reserves of coal at the 
end of 1999 (million tonnes) 114,500 249,994 157,010 984,453 
Population as of 2000 (thousand) 1,275 ,133 283 ,230 145,491 6,056,715 
Coal reserves per capita (thousand tonnes) 90 883 1,079 163 
Note: Proved recoverable reserves are the tonnage that can be ex甘acted from the earth under present 
and expected local economic conditions with existing available technology. 
Source: For coal reserves, as Table 2. For population, United Nations, "United Nations Population 
Network," available from http://www.un.org/popinJdata.html. accessed 5 June 2002 
No other major economy is as reliant on coal as is China. Although the recent increase in oil 
imports moderately reduces its relative significance, coal's share of primary energy supply in 
China remains the highest among all the types of energy resources-the proportion was 68 
percent in 1999.49 While the known coal reserves in China are 12 percent ofthe entire 
world's, China's coal consumption amounts to 24 percent ofthe worJd's. Clùna's RfP ratio 
(coal reserves divided by annual production) is, therefore, lllyears-far below other regions' 
ratios (Table 2) 
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T able 2: RIP Ratio 
Proved recoverable reserves Production in 1999 RlP ratio 
of coal at the end of 1999~ (b) (alb) 
(a) 
(million tonnes) (mi l1 ion tonnes) (years) 
Africa 55,367 231 240 
North America 257,966 1,080 239 
SOllth America 21 ,752 46 474 
China 114,500 1,030 111 
Asia excluding China 137,808 640 215 
Russian Federation (RF) 157,010 249 630 
ElIrope excluding RF 155,676 758 205 
Middle East 1,710 2 1,140 
Oceania 82,664 308 269 
World 984,453 4,343 227 
Source: World Energy Council (訊屯C)， "Survey ofEnergy Resources," 
http://www.worldenergy.orglwec-geis/publications/reports/serlcoal/coal.asp, accessed 4 
June 2002 
While removal ofparticulates (which is relatively simple) improves, sulphur dioxide 
emissions remain nearly out of control and still the primary cause of China's air pollution. 
sulphur dioxide emissions, generated mainly from the burning of coal , have roughly 
paralleled the increase in coal consumption.50 Unless there are serious efforts to curb 
emissions in the near future , annual sulphur dioxide emissions from China may rise by an 
estimated 50 percentbetween 1993 and 2010.51 The environmental effects ofsulphur dioxide 
emissions occur primarily through acid rain. Because the quantity of sulphur dioxide being 
discharged in China is increasing, the total surface area suffering from acid rain continues to 
expand. Acid rain in centraJ and southwestern parts of China is relatively severe, while the 
situation in the south is getting worse . The area affected by acid rain is about 30 percent of 
China's totalland area.52 Moreover, the problem is spreading to South Korea and Japan, 
where studies in some prefectures identify halfthe acidic fallout as originating in China 幻
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Chína's inefficient use of coal is the proximate cause of íts massíve coal consumption 
and resulting sulphur dioxide emissions. Coal accounts for an estimated 90 percent of China's 
sulphur dioxide emissions generated from fossil fuel consumption.54 The cleaning of sulphur 
from coal remains di伍cult in China, partly because the proportion of sulphur in the coal is 
relatively hígh and the coal itself is relatively difficult to wash.55 The unwashed coal is 
causing increased sulphur dioxide emissions and decreased energy efficíency. Thus coal is 
used inefficiently and most users rely on raw coal. Untíl recently, China only washed some 
22 percent of its coal. Although the Ninth Five-Year Plan requires all new and many existing 
coal mines to install coal prep訂ation facilities, with the objective ofwashing 30 percent of all 
coal, 56 the proportion remains moderate compared to about 45 percent in the United States 
and more 出租 75 percent in Europe.57 
Now is arguably the time for China to further invigorate and implement its energy 
policies and shift away from a coal-based development pattem to a more efficient, sustainable 
and environmentally 企iendly one. 
Measures for Efficient Coal Use and Obstacles to Those Measures 
Efficient use of coal is essent凶 bo血 to avoid fu仙re coal shortages and to reduce sulphur 
dioxide emissions. If China were to raíse its energy efficiency to the level of deve10ped 
countries, it would reduce its coal consumption by one third.58 Advanced technologies used 
ín developed countries can improve efficiency of coal use in China. Unlíke traditional sulphur 
scrubbers, advanced clean coal technologies offer China an opportunity to reduce emíssíons 
while improving plant e旺iciency or energy output or both戶 The expense of íntroducing such 
technologíes, however, restricts their application in China. Coalmines have not invested in 
better equipment to produce high-quality coal because they lack the funds. Simílarly, due to 
financial restrictions, China's electric power plants wiII not equip desulphurisation devices in 
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the near term. The initial cost of the 叮niddle-sized" device (a device for a 0.5 mw power 
plant) is at leac;t US$ 450 million, and the annual operation and rilaintenance costs reach at 
least US$ 90 million. Because it needs more energy, China would prefer another power plant 
rather than pay the extra costs of installing and maintaining these desulphurisation devices.60 
Thus, developed countries and intemational aid organizations need to work even harder with 
China by providing the fmancing 由at helps it to introduce advanced technologies 
Coal pricing policy is also vital for efficient coal use. By increasing the price of coal 
so that it inc1udes the social costs of air pollution, there will be new incentives to consume 
coal more efficiently. This would result in resource savings and reduced sulphur dioxide 
emissions. AIso, quality-related prices would restrain producers from selling high-quality 
coal for expo此， which leaves the dirty coal for the domestic market. 61 Prices that re f1ect 
social and environmental costs would give consumers incentives ("signals") to conserve 
energy and thereby reduce sulphur dioxide emissions. Coal prices that remain too low 
discourage consumers' efficient use and encourage hannful fuel choices. They also encourage 
producers' moral hazard.62 
Compared 、叫th the energy-rich United States, while the steam-coal prices in China 
appear reasonable, those of coking coal remain low and suggest room for price adjustment 
(Table 3) 
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Table 3: Coal Prices (USS per metric ton) 
Steam Coal for Industry: 
1996 1997 1998 
China 39.88 42.62 37.64 
US 35.59 35.7 35.6 
Differential 4.29 6.92 2.04 
Coking Coal for Industry: 
1995 1996 1997 
China 40.2 39.98 42.55 
US 52.18 52.18 52.22 
Differential -1 1.98 -12.2 -9 .67 
Note: Average unit value at C[F (cargo, insurance and freight) base 
Source: Energy Information Administration, "Intemational Coal Price Information," available from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/coal.html#IntlPrices, accessed 5 June 2002 
In fact, China has already taken measures to use coal price signalling, but those measures are 
inadequate. China removed most coal price controls in 1994 .的 Before that price 
liberalization, the controlled coal prices were too low and the price differences too narrow to 
reflect economic costs (mainly transportation costs) and social costs. Following price 
liberalization in January 1994, coal prices increased. The price increase, however, was due 
mainly to transportation costs, which account for up to 70 percent of the deliverγprice of 
coal (compared with 30-50 percent in the United States) .“ Price variety is, to a large extent, 
dependent on the economic costs of bringing coal to market. Hence coal prices, while higher, 
still do not reflect full social costs, keeping them low relative to alternative fuels (e.g, oil and 
gas) . This sustains the heavy reliance on coa1.65 While coal prices remain relatively low, there 
will be an under-sllpply of high-grade coals to the domestic market. Thlls the social costs of 
burning coal and its quality (both are negatively correlated) should be factored into current 
prices. The gove口unent should lift remaining price controls and coal prices should internalise 
environmental factors. 66 
The introduction of these and other coal pricing policies face several obstacIes . The 
conservatÏve bureaucracy in China is reluctant to make dr臼tic changes to coal pricing policy 
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The Ministry of Coal Industry, which has been absorbed into the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, is tradition-bound. So-called "coal bureaucrats" hold 血e power to decide coat 
prices.67 1t is unpteasant for them 出at füll market mechanisms should decide coal prices, or 
that other ministries related to the environrnent might have rights to affect coal prices. 
Furthennore, the relationship between the provincial and central governments hinders 
increases in coal prices 也at would reflect true social costs and coal quality. 甘le resource tax 
on coal sales provides revenue for provincial governments, and it is dependent on the arnount 
of coal sold.68 If the central government were to increase coal prices, coal sales could be 
curbed, thus decreasing the revenue ofthe provincial governments. In addition, the resource 
tax is not charged on washed and processed coals (i.e. , relatively good quality coals). Insofar 
as the central government's coal pricing policy encourages the production ofbetter quality 
coals，也at also reduces provincial governments' revenues. Thus, the central government's 
coal pricing policy for sustainable development could face strong resistance 金om provincial 
governments. 
Another obstac1e to a new coal pricing policy is China's current short-sighted 
economic growth policy, which relies to a great degree on exports. Exports are one ofthe 
most important engines of economic grow由 in China (Table 4), and these robust exports are 
supported by low energy prices. 
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Table 4: China's GDP, Exports, and Exports to GDP 
GDP Exports Exports to 
(bnRMB) (bn RMB) GDP (%) 
1985 896.4 80.9 9.0 
1987 1196.3 147.0 12.3 
1989 1690.9 195.6 11.6 
1991 216 1.8 382.7 17.7 
1993 3463 .4 528.5 15.3 
1995 5847.8 1245.2 2 1.3 
1997 7477.2 1515.3 20.3 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China, China Statistical Yearbook 1998 
(Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998), pp. 55 , 620 
Furthennore, China's export structure has been shifting from one dominated by primary 
commodities to one relying on manufactured goods (Table 5). In other words , China's export 
structure has become more reliant on energy consumption 
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Table 5: Structure ofExport (US$ 100 million) 
"" 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 
Primary Goods 138.28 132.31 150.78 161 .45 166.66 214.85 239.30 
(Share in Total) (50.6) (33.5) (28.7) (22.5) (18.2) (14.4) (13.1 ) 
Manufactured 135.22 262.06 374.60 556.98 750.78 1272.95 1587.67 
Goods 
(Share in Total) (49 .4) (66.5) (71 .3) (77.5) (81.8) (85.6) (86.9) 
Total 273.50 394.37 525.38 718 .43 917 .44 1487.80 1826.97 
Note: 1n 1993 a new commodity catalogue was used in the cllstoms statistics, and products not 
otherwise classified in the previous years have been classified and included in different 
categories of commodities 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China. China Statistical Yearbook 1998 
(Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998), p. 621 
China is not yet exporting high value-added products.69 China's strategy is to be competitive 
in the international market; that 峙， to sell cheaper products in p訂t due to cheaper energy 
prices. The Jow energy prices could be described as "invisible subsidies" to export industries, 
or what some might label "environmental dumping." (Of course, other countries subsidize 
energy prices in various ways, with similar effect.) 
China's Coal Pricing Policy and Agenda 21 
Energy pricing policies are essential components of sustainable development. Thus it is not 
surprising that they are discussed explicitly in Agenda 21 . Here we look at China's energy 
pricing policies in the context ofthe three Agenda 21 chapters summarized above (Chapter 2 
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on the relation between trade and energy prices; Chapter 9 on air pollution and energy prices; 
and Chapter 33 on applications to energy prices and related development assistance). 
In terms of coal pricing policy, Chapter 2 points out several important issues. Most 
importantly, the chapter 叮ges that commodity prices should reflect environmental and social 
costs (para. 2.14). It also advocates freeing up cornmodity markets to reflect true costs, 
presumably advocating price signalling of coal quality from suppliers to consumers through 
market mechanisms. Supplementing pricing policies that re f1ect true social costs, this chapter 
also proposes promotion of effective tax systems (p訂a. 2.37[f1). Chapter 2 further promotes 
removing bureaucratic obstac1es to the introduction of price po1icies mentioned above (para. 
2.37位]) . In this context, China decontrolled coal markets and introduced a resource tax 
However, as we mentioned earlier, the effect is not enough. Of course, since the focus of 
Chapter 2 is mainly agricultural commodities-those that depend on international market 
agreements, such as cocoa, coffee, sugar and tropical timber (para. 2.16)-一those quite vit到
issues might have not been considered for coal pricing policies. In addition, though Chapter 2 
points to tariff and non-tari旺 impediments as restrictions on intemational trade (para. 2.7), the 
chapter does not c1early caution 出at to keep domestic energy prices low by neglecting social 
cost could be a non-tarifftrade barrier 
One objective of Chapter 9 is to reduce adverse effects on the atmosphere from the 
energy sector (para. 9.11). It urges governments to promote economic measures that improve 
energy efficiency (para. 9.12[h]), because energy efficiency 1eads to reduced adverse effects 
on the atmosphere (para. 9.11). China has tried to use more legalistic measures, such as 
amendment ofthe Air pollutíon Prevention and Control Law. As a useful step both for 
prevention of air po lJ ution and for sustainable economic development by energy-savings, 
China should undertake economic measures, such as much more market-driven coal pricing 
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1n this sense, Chapter 9 would be more useful for governments if it had been more specific on 
the content of recommended economic measures, such as effective energy pricing policies. 
~ 
Chapter 33 focuses on a vital issue for environmental protection projects: financing. 
Agenda 21 points out that the bulk of financing for the implementation of sustainable 
development will come from the developing countries themse1ves (para. 33.13). This cou1d 
encourage governments to frnance environmental conservation projects, at least partially, by 
imp1ementing energy pricing policies that inc1ude new taxes or levies for wastefu1 emissions. 
At the same time, Chapter 33 calls for extema1 funds 企om multilateral development banks, 
bilateral donors, private fun血， etc. Regarding energy pricing policies of fund-receiving 
countries, however, the chapter wams multilateral donors not to introduce new forms of 
conditionality when disbursing funds to recipient countries (para. 33.14[a]). Nevertheless, the 
Wor1d Bank has already proposed that energy pricing policy in China should be amended to 
intemalise costs for environmenta1 protection. Some b i1ateral donors, inc1uding Japan, a1so 
expect China to increase applicable energy prices so that projects relating to energy can be 
implemented and maintained without outside funding. To be sure, many deve10ping 
countries, inc1uding China, might view these conditions as interference in their intemal 
affairs. However, it seems prudent for funding agencies to continue pushing for new energy 
pricing policies that reflect true environmenta1 costs, and to consider attaching efiìciency-
related conditions (that are more environmentally prudent) on loans that are disbursed by 
bilateral and multilatera1 donors 
Conclusion 
This brief 100k at one 臼pect of China's po1icies for economic development suggests that 
efforts by governments to negotiate sustainable deve10pment over the last three decades are , 
to some extent, being actualised. The principles propounded in Agenda 21 have been 
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reflected, to a limited degree, in China. But even in the narrow (yet vitally important) area of 
coal use, there is much room for additional action. This case shows that economic 
development and the environment are indeed related issues. Agenda 21 takes this into 
account, thereby indicating that energy po1icies-in this case coal pricing policy in China-
are vital for sustainable development. However, reflecting the di伍culty of negotiating 
detailed agreements (even voluntary ones) that can restrict national sovereignty, it does not 
clearly specify what energy pricing policy should be in each country. The best policies will 
qUlte 0缸en depend on each country's particul缸 situation ， such as its resource endowment, 
type of major energy, and so on. Thus it might be difficult for an international agreement like 
Agenda 21 to provide specific guidance for an issue 但 specific as coal prices in China. In 
other words, the irnpact of Agenda 21 may be limited to general guidance. This limitation 
requires a11 actors involved, ranging from national governments and intemational 
organizations to bilateral donors and nongovemmental organizations, to consider national 
circumstances. This will help overcome domestic obstacles to implementing the objectives of 
Agenda 21 and other intemational agreements intended to bring about sustainable 
development. Th.is could be one of the ways for China and interested intemational actors to 
defuse the environmental "bombshel l." 
Importantly, however, are the underlying motivations most states have for joining and 
implementing Agenda 21 and other international agreements and regimes designed to 
promote environmentally sustainable development. If a state participates enthusiastically and 
genuinely desires to work toward agreed goals, its implementation will be much more robust 
If it participates for other reasons, such as to garner intemational aid and technology, 
implementation will occur only insofar as actions can be justified for other, non-
environmental reasons. China's participation in the Agenda 21 negotiations was guarded. It 
sought to protect its sovereignty and freedom of action, and it wanted to extract new funds 
29 
and technology from developed counuies.70 Having said this, extant environmental awareness 
was strengthened among Chinese during the UNCED process, and that awareness and 
~ p 
concem has grown substantially over the last decade as environmental conditions have 
deteriorated markedly. This evolution and groVvth in underlying support for Agenda 21's 
goals suggests that China's sustainable development policies related to coal and energy use, 
as well as other econornic acti\'叫es with environmental consequences, will become more 
robust in the future. Whether these policies can overcome resistance 台om provincial 
governments and 0伍cials， weak regulat。可 institutions ， and the pervasive greed ofpowerful 
interests within Chinese government and society, is quite another matter.71 Arguab旬， the job 
。fthose in Beijing pushing for more sustainable development is made easier by intemational 
environmental agreements because they in.fluence the "credibility, prestige, and financial 
resources ofthe national government."72 What this case shows is that voluntary intemational 
environmental agreements can have inf1uence and can provide guidance for economic 
development. But there must be a strong wi l1ingness among all interested actors to act, as 
well as the associated regulatory capacity. 
Ofwhat value is Agenda 21 specifically? For China and other developing countries, 
Agenda 21 and other international agreements sharing its principles provide justification for 
obtaining international financial and teclmological 部sistance from developed countries 
Conditional bilateral aid from Japan and muItilateral funding 企om intemational financial 
institutions are manifestations of this. Furthermore, as environmental awareness grows in 
China and other developing countries, particularly among the general population, Agenda 21 
provides guidelines and serves as a model for policy action. Increasingly, it can be used by 
domestic policy actors 但 intemational support for changes in economic policies and 
programs 
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To be sure, Agenda 21 by itself is of limited utility; it would be wrong to say that it 
defines development policy. But it has become part ofthe mix ofincentives, both domestic 
and intemational, that shape economic development policies. Combined with the incentives 
like new financing, it nudges economic policy in the direction of less envirorunentally 
destructive practices. China's environrnental time bomb may yet explode (and arguably is, 
albeit in more-or-less slow motion), bút it may do so later or in ways that are less harmful to 
the natural world or at least more manageable by the intemational community-and the 
Chinese themselves 
Notes 
I The authors wish to thank the International Joint-Research Program ofthe Centre for Asian Pacific 
Studies and the Centre for Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University, for financial assistance aiding 
our co \laboration 
2 Bates Gill , "Limited Engagement," Foreign Affairs 78, 4 (July/August 1999), p. 66 
3 "Agenda 21" in United Nations, Report ofthe United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development. Rio de Janeiro. 3-14 June 1992, Volume 1: Resolutions Adopted by the Con.戶rence
(New York: United Nations, 1993), A/CONF.151126IRev.l (Vo l.I), pp. 9-479. 
4 La\vrence R. Sullivan, "The Three Gorges Dam and the Issue ofSustainable Development ín China," 
in Norman J. Vig and Regina S. Axelrod, eds., The Global Environment: lnstitutions. Law αnd Policy 
(\九Tashington: Congressional Quarterly, 1999), p. 312, n. 6 
5 See Abigail R. Jahiel , "The Organization ofEnvironmental Protection in China," The China 
Quαrterly 156 (December 1998), p. 757; E.C.Y. Tseng, "The Environment and the People's Republic 
ofChina," In D.L. Soden and B.S. Steel , eds ., Handbook ofGlobal Environmental Policy and 
Adl71 inistratioll (Basel: Marcel Dekker, 1999), p. 383 
6 Sullivan. See also works cited in Sullivan, including Vaclav Sm口 ， Environmental Problems in 
China, East West Center Special Report No. 5 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii , 1996) and Smil, 
China's Environmental Crisis (Armonk, NY: Sharp巴， 1993)
7 See Declaration ofthe United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc 
A/CONF .48/l 4 (1 972) 
S Lorraine Ellio仗， The Global Politics of the Environment (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 12-13, 108 
9 Mark A. Gra仇 "The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment," Environmental Law 
20 , 2 (1990), pp. 291-319 
31 
10 United Nations Conference on E l1vironment and Development, Report ofthe UN Conference on 
Environment and Development: Annex 1. Rio Dec/aration .l}n Environment and Development. UN 
Doc. AlCONF.15 1126 (vo1. 1), 12 August 1992; United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Deve10pment, Report of the [刀VCo月舟rence on Environment and Development: Annex 11. Agenda-21 , 
UN Doc. AlCONF.151126 (vo l. 1), 12 August 1992; United Nations Conference 011 Environment and 
Deve10pment, Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principlesfor a Global Consenus on 
the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types 0 Forests, UN Doc 
AlCONF .151/26 (vol. III), 14 August 1992; United N ations lntergovemmental N egotiating 
CommitteelFramework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1992); United Nations 
Environment Programme, Convention on Biological Diversi抄(Nairobi: UNEP/CBD Secretariat, 
1992 
11 Derek Osbom and Tom Bigg, Earth Summit 1/: Outcomes and Analysis (London: Earthscan 
Publications, 1998). See United Nations, Assessment of Progress λlade Since the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Deve/opment (New York: United Nations, 1997) 
12 World Commission on Envìronment and Development (WCED), Our Common Futllre (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 43 . The definìtion of sustainable development is subject to 
widespread dispute. See, for ex肌肉， Thaddeus C. Trzy悶，此， A Sustainable World: D昕ningand
Measuring Sustainable Development (Sacramento: Califomia lnstitute ofPublic Affaìrs) and Susan 
Baker et 祉， The Po/itics of Sustainable Deve/opment (London: Routledge, 1997). 
13 Norman J. V屯， "Introduction: Goveming the lntemational Environment," ìn Vig and Axelrod, , p. 
7 
14 See, Mìranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy, eds., The 1nternationalization of Environmental 
Protection (Cambridge: Cambrìdge University Press, 1997) and Michael Oksenberg and Elizabeth 
Economy, "China: Implementation Under Economic Growth and Market Reform," in Engaging 
Countries: Strengthening Compliance With 1nternationa/ Em收onmental Accords (Cambridge，卸1A :
MIT Press, 1998), pp. 353-394 
15 "Agenda 21 ," Chapter 1 (Preamble) 
16 Gary C. Bryner, "Agenda 21: Myth or Reality?" in Vig and Axelrod, pp. 160. Bryner's chapter is an 
excellent summary of Age l1da 21 's objectives and of progress toward achieving those objectìves a自er
five years 
17 "Agenda 21 ," paras. 2.1-2 .43 
18 Para. 2.2 
19 Para. 2 .3 7 
20 Para. 2.3 7(a) 
21 Para. 2 .37(e) 
32 
22 Para. 2 .3 7( f) 
23 Paras. 9.1-9 .35 
24 Many ofthese areas are addressed by intemational agreements dealing with global atmospheric 
pollutíon, notably the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the 
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, and similar agreements dealing with regional 
pollution. Chapter 9 recommends that countries act in accordance with these instruments and take 
addítíonal voluntary actíons consistent with them. See para. 9.2 
25 Para. 9.9 
26 Ibid 
27 World Resources Institllte et al., World Resources 1996-97 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), pp. 315-25. See also Intematíonal Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (París: Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Dev巳lopme肘， 1995) 
28 Paras. 33 .1-33 .21 
29 See specífically paras. 33.1 , 33.10, 33.14; italics added 
30 Paras. 33. 14(a-f). 
31 Para. 33.16(c). 
32 Diplomats arrived at a very rough estimate that annual costs of implementing Agenda 21 wOllld be 
$600 bi Jlion, with $125 bi Jl ion expected to come from grants or concessional ODA. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, the $125 billion figure co叮叮ponded to 0.7 percent ofthe developing countries' GNPs 
3) Para. 33.13. 
34 For a development ofthis argllment, see Paul G. Harris, Intemational Equity and Global 
Environmental Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), pp. 44-88 
35 Elízabeth C. Economy, "China's Envíronmental Diplomacy," ín Samuel S. Kim , ed ., China and the 
Wor!d (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 265 . See also Elizabeth Economy, "Chinese Policy-
Making and Global Climate Change: Two-Front Diplomacy and the International Community," in 
Economy and Schreurs, pp. 19-41 
36 Lester Ross, "The Polítics ofEnvironmental Policy in the People's Republíc ofChina," ín Uday 
Des訓 ， ed. , Eco!ogical Policy and Po /itics in Developing Countries (Albany: State Uníversíty ofNew 
Y ork Press, 1998), p. 47 
37 Yll-shí Mao, "Chína," ín Martín lanícke and Helmut Weidner, eds., National Em收onmental
Po /icies: A Comparative Study ofCapacity Building (Berlin: Springer-Verl嗯， 1997), p. 252 
:1 8 Chrístíane Beuermanr丸 "China and Climate Change," in Gunnar Fermann, ed ., International 
Politics ofClimate Change (Oslo: Scandínavian Uníversity Pre鈴， 1997), p. 22。
39 Ecollomy, "Chína's Environmental Diplomacy," p. 265 
4日 Ibid ， p. 276 
41 Beuermann, p. 232 
33 
42 The Administrative Center for China's Agenda 21 , "China's Agenda 21: China's White Paper for 
Population, Environment and Deve10pment in the 21st Centuηr，" Chapter 1, Preamble, availab1e from 
ht仗tp:圳//w叭、叭、
4約3 Economy, "China's Environmental Diplomacy," p. 278 
“ World Bank Group, "The World Bank and China, " available from 
http://wblnOO 18. worldbank.org!eap/eap.nsf/a 71 f97 484cde 7250852567 c9007 67289/6049af06c4b9242 
7852567d 1 006bf6f1 ?OpenDocument, accessed 2 March 2000 
45 Asian Development Bank, "ADB Online, Statistics,'‘ availab1e from 
http://www.adb.org!AboutlStatistics/lending.asp, accessed 2 March 2000 
46 Japan Bank for Intemational Cooperation, "Economic Cooperation," available from http://www. 
jbic.go .jp/eng1ishloec/projectli吋ex.php， accessed 5 June 2002 
47 Average arnbient p訂ticulate concentrations in many monitored cities have actually decreased 
marked旬， re f1ecting increased particulate control. World Bank, Clear Water, Bllle Skies (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1997), pp. 8-9. 
48 China's per capita endowments of crude oil and natural gas are also far below the worldaverage 
。bid. p. 49). 
49 Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), "APEC Energy Data Base," available from 
http://叭叭.v.ieej.or.j p/apec/， accessed 4 June 2002. 
50 World Bank, Clear Water, Bllle Skies (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), p. 8. 
51 James P. Dorian, Energy;1I China (London: Financial Times Energy Pub!ishing, 1995), p. 92 
52 Kaigai Kankyo Ky。可oku Senta (KKKS), Chz倍。ku ni okeru Kan卸o Seisaku Shikojo 710 Juyokadai 
oyobi Nicchu Kan妙。局10ryoku no Jutenbunya [The}.句or Problems for lmplementation of 
Environmental Po/icies 的 China and rhe Foca! Sectors of Japanese-Chinese Cooperation for 
Environment] (Tokyo: KKKS, 1999), p. 5. 
53 Dorian, p. 93 . China's sulphur dioxide emissions have become a cross-bordered problem. Also, 
greenhouse gases are generated from the buming of coal. Thus coal use should be considered in terms 
ofthe global climate change as well 
54 Bingsheng Li and Char1es J. Johnson, "Environment and Economic Challenges to Coa!'s Future in 
China," AIC China Power Conference (Beijing: 1994), p. 24: quoted in Dorian, p. 92 
55 Zhengang Xu, Yaqin Gao and Xiangqin Lei , "Programs and Priorities for Increasing Coa1 Buming 
E叮iciency in China and Imp1ications for Greenhouse Gas Emissions," presented to the Global 
Environment Facility workshop, June 16-17, 1997, Amsterdam , quoted in Intemationa1 Energy 
Agency (lEA), Coa! in the Energy S lIpply ofChina (Paris: IEA, 1999), p. 61 . 
56 lEA, p. 6 1. 
34 
57 World 8ank, p. 46 
58 Takashi Somura, Sansei U--Chi仲uKan句10 no Yukue μcid Rαin--Directions ofGlobal 
Environment] (Tokyo: Chuo Hoki Shuppan, 1997), p. 197 
59 Dorian, p. 92. 
ωJapan Environmental Council, Ajia Kan妙o Hakusho 1997/1998 [White Paper on Asian 
Environment 1997/1998] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1997), p. 232 . 
61 Coal with low sulphur content in China is mainly for export. Thus coal with high sulphur content 
tends to be for domestic use (Somu悶， p. 194). China's largest coal production base of Datong, which 
is eager to enter the international market, is improving the quality of export coal (Dorian, p. 86) 
62 Moral hazard happens when the agent's effort, offered after the contract has been signed, is not 
verifiable. In the circumstance where coal prices are controlled or do not reflect quality (the 
circumstance can be regarded as an implicit contract between producers and a coal pricing policy 
maker), coal producers' (i .e., agents') efforts to produce better quality coals are not verifiable, and thus 
the producers could tend to supply low quality coals. For more details of moral h~zard， see David 
Perez-Castrillo and Ines Macho-Stadl缸， An lntroduction to the Economics of lnformation (Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 1997) 
63 However, the Chinese govemment still maintains control of some major coalmines and their sales 
to ensure necessa可 supplies for key infrastructural projects (Dorian, p. 52) 
“ Xiadong Wang, "China's Coallndustry: Moving toward Market Economy," World 8ank, Summer 
Internship Project (Washington, D.C.: World Bank., 1996), quoted in World Bank, p. 52. 
65 China has been a net-oil-importing country since 1993. China also restrains energy prices (mainly 
coal prices) to abate extemal inflation pressure of importing oil price hike. 
66 Although coal prices are institutionally determined by market, the prices of coal used for electricity 
generation are still sllpervised by the government and it co-ordinates the sales of coal through annual 
meetings (IEA, p. 51). 8y way of comparison, a sulphur dioxide fee is currently being charged in 
industry. However, the fee can be treated as an expenditure in account books and is not large enough 
Also this type of levy is not feasible for numerous small users. Dorian has argued that in China coal 
consllmption in the power sector is relatively inelastic. As evidence he points out that between 1990 
and 1993 coal consumption in most other sectors stagnated or even declined, whereas consumption in 
the power sector increased by abollt 30 percent (Dorian, p. 125). This might mislead readers t l1at the 
coal price hike will not result in efficient coal use. However, the price hike in that period was not 
large enough . Responding only to that price-hike range, one might expect the demand curve of coal in 
the energy sector to have been rather steep. AIso, to save hard currency for importing oil, the 
government encouraged the conversion of oil-fired plants to coal-fired ones in that period. Further 
research is needed on the elasticity of coal demand curbs 
35 
的 Hajime Tozaki , "Chugoku no Enerugi to Kankyo Mondai [China's Energy and Environmental 
Problems] ," in lkuo Kayahara, ed., Chugoku Enerugi Semyaku (China's Energy Strategy) (電okyo
Aki Shobo, 1996), p. 183 
68 The resource tax has been in甘oduced to (1) conserve energy, (2) adjust incomes among coal mines, 
and (3) adjust development gaps among regions (Jiang Li, Jiang Xi-Ning and Toshiyuki Fushimi, 
Saishin Chugoku Zeisei Gaido [The Newest China's Ta.'C System Guide] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
Shinbunsha, 1997), p. 134). However, as we explained, due to inefficient coal use, the tax does not 
realise the first pu中ose
69 Although in 2000 the top export commodity in terms ofvalue was "automatic data processing 
machines, etc. ," the second-highest value export commodity w臼 machine pa也 and accessories, 
followed by jerseys, women's clothes, and footwear (lntemational Trade Center, "Country Specific 
Trade Analysis," available from http://www.intracen.orglmenus/countries.h恤， accessed June 6, 2002 
According to the Intemational Trade Center's analysis in the period form 1996 to 2000, 
10 Cf. Economy, "Chinese Policy-Making and Global Climate Change." 
71 See Mao and Shui-Yan Tang, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Kai-Chee Cheung and Jack Man-Keung Lo, 
"Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China," The China Quarter砂 152
(December 1997), pp. 863-874 
12 Oksenberg and Economy, p. 359 
36 
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 
Department of Economics 
Dr. CHEUNG, Kui-yin (張鉅賢)
Dr. FAN, Chengze Simon (范承澤)
Professor HO, Lok-sang (何澡生)
Dr. L肘， Ping (林平)
Dr. MA, Yue (馬躍)
Dr. RAN, Jimmy (冉齊鳴)
Dr. VOON, Thomas (溫演鏢)
Dr. WEI, Xiangdong (魏向東)
Centre Fellows 
Dep訂個lent of Politics and Sociology 
Dr. BAEHR, Peter 
Professor BRIDGES. Brian 
Dr. CHAN, Che-po (陳宮博)
Dr. HARRIS. Paul 
Dr. LEE, Keng-mun William (李經艾)
Dr. LEUNG, Kit-fun Beatnce (梁潔芬)
Dr. REN, Yuβ(任越)
Dr. WONG, Yiu-chung (王耀宗)
Honorary Fellows 
Dr. CHEUNG, Hoi-cheung (張海祥)
Professor LIU, Wìlliam Thomas (劉融)
Dr. LU, Fei-yun (陸耕云)
Dr. NG, Chi-wing Raymond (吳志榮)
Centre for Public Pol~y Studies 
Centre FeUows 
Department of Economics 
Dr. LEI, Kai-cheong (李繼祥)
Dr.L肘， Ping (林平)
Dr. MA, Yue (馬躍)
Dr. W凹， Xiangdong (魏向東)
Dep訂值lent of Politics and Sociology 
Dr. HARRlS, Paul 
Dr. SIU, Oi-ling (蕭愛鈴)
Honora叮， Fellow 
Dr. CHE, Wai去in(車煒堅)
Working Paper Series 
型企工 工盟~ 主坐坐r
60 (1 6/97) CPPS Filial Piety and Caregiving Burden in Shanghai , Professor William T. L仙，
People's Republic ofChina Professor Elena S. H. Yu, 
Professor Shang-Gong Sun and 
Professor Yin Kean 
61 (1 7月7) CPPS How to Help the Rehabilitated Drug Abusers Not to Dr. Wai-kin Che 
Relapse to Drugs Again? 
A Successful Case . Hong Kong 
62 (18月7) CPPS The Value ofTime and the Interaction ofthe Quantity & Dr. Chengze Simon Fan 
the Quality of Children 
63 (19月7) CPPS Generational Dependency and Elderly Care: Dr. Ying-yi Hong and 
A Psychological Interpretation ofCultural Norms and Professor William T. Liu 
Exchange 
64 (20月7) CPPS Living Arrangements and Elderly Care: 甘1e Case of Profe~sor Rance P. L. Lee, 
Hong Kong Dr. Jik-Joen Lee, 
Professor Elena S. H. Yu, 
Professor Shang-Gong Sun and 
Professor William T. Liu 
65 (21月7) CPPS The Social Origin of Alzheimer's Disease: A Path Professor William T. Liu and 
Analysis Professor Shang-Gong Sun 
66 (22月7) CAPS Country of Origin Rules: Its Origin, Nature and Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Directions for Refonn 
67 (23月7) CAPS A Long Term Monetary Strategy for Hong Kong and Professor Lok-sang Ho 
China 
68 (24月7) CPPS Are Union Jobs Worse? Are Government Jobs Better? Professor John S. Heywood, 
Professor W. S. Siebert and 
Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
69 (25月7) CPPS Restructuring the Party/state Relations: Dr. Yiu-chung Wong 
China's Political Structural Refonn in the 1980s 
70 (26月7) CPPS Estimating British Workers' Demand for Safety Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
71 (27月7) CPPS Managerial Stress in Hong Kong and Taiwan: A Ms. Oi-ling Siu, 
Comparative Study Dr. Luo Lu and 
Professor Cary L. Cooper 
72 (28月7) CPPS Teaching Social Science in the East Asian Context Professor William T. Liu 
73 (1 /98) CPPS Interpreting the Basic Law with Chinese Characteristics Professor James C. Hsiung 
No. 
74 (2/98) CPPS 
75 (3/98) CPPS 
76 (4/98) CPPS 
77 (5/98) CPPS 
78 (6月8)CAPS
79 (7月8) CAPS 
80 (8/98) CPPS 
81 (9/98) CAPS 
82 (10/98) CAPS 
83 (1 1月 8) CAPS 
84 (12/98) CAPS 
85 (13/98) CAPS 
86 (14月8) CAPS 
87 (15/98) CPPS 
88 (16/98) CPPS 
89 (1/99) CPPS 
90 (2/99) CPPS 
主哩i豆
Worker Participation and Finn Perfonnance: Evidence 
from Gennany and Britain ~ 
The Nature of Optimal Public Policy 
Symbolic Boundaries and Middle Class Fonnation in 
HongKong 
Urbanization in Sha Tin and Tuen Mun - Problems and 
Coping Str'ategies 
Coping with Contagion: Europe and the Asian 
Economic Crisis 
New World Order and a New U.S. Policy Toward China 
Pove此Y Policy in Hong Kong: Westem Models and 
Cultural Divergence 
The Paradox of Hong Kong as a Non-Sovereign 
Jnternational Actor 
Political Impacts of Catholic Education in 
Decolonization: Hong Kong and Macau 
The Rise and Fall ofthe HK Economy 
中國貿易保護代價的測算:方法、結論和意義
中國居民收入差距的擴大及其原因
The Labor Jncome Tax Equivalent of Price Scissors in 
Pre-Reform China 
Complementarity, Jnvestment lncentives, and 
Evolution of Joint Ventures 
A Theory of Health and Health Policy 
Towards a New Intemational Monetary Order: The 
World Currency Unit and the Global Indexed Bond 
AgeDi叮erences in Work Adjustment: A Study ofMale 
and Female Managerial Stress, Coping Strategies and 
Locus of Control in Hong Kong 
Author 
Professor Johñ T. Addison, 
Professor W. Stanley Siebert, 
Professor Joachim Wagner and 
Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
卸Is . Annie H. N. Chan 
Mr. Hong-kin Kwok and 
Mr. Shing-tak Chan 
eo ρ』OD 
AU F-B n 兔MFA B P.-D 
Professor James C. Hsiung 
Dr. William Lee and 
Professor John Edwards 
Professor James C. Hsiung 
Dr. Beatrice Leung 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
張曙光教授
趙人偉教授、李實教授
Dr. Hiroyuki lmai 
Dr. Ping Lin and 
Dr. Kamal Saggi 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Dr. Oi-ling Siu, 
Professor Paul E. Spector, 
Professor Cary L. Cooper, 
Dr. Kate Sparks and 
Dr. Ian Donald 
No. 
91 (3/99) CAPS 
92 (4/99) CPPS 
93 (5/99) CPPS 
94 (6/99) CAPS 
95 (7/99) CPPS 
96 (8/99) CPPS 
97 (9月9) CAPS 
98 (1/00) CAPS 
主盟ic
A Comparative Study of Man-agerial Stress in Greater 
China: The Direct and lndirect Effects of Coping 
Strategies and Work Locus ofControl 
Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of 
Financial Intermediation 
R & 0 Incentives in Vertica l1y Re!ated lndustries 
Testing for a Nonlinear Relationship among 
Fundamentals and Exchange Rates in the ERM 
Health Care Delivery and Financing: in Search of an 
ldeal Mode! - Reflections on the Harvard Report 
A Structural Equation Model of Environmental Attitude 
and Behaviour: The Hong Kong Experience 
Hong Kong's Inflation under the U.S. Dollar Peg: The 
Balassa-Samuelson Effect or the Dutch Disease? 
Structural Transformation and Economic Growth in 
Hong Kong: Another Look at Young's “A Tale ofTwo 
Cities" 
99 (2/00) CAPS Corporatism and Civil Society in the People's Republic 
of China: Empirical Evidçnce and Theoretical 
Implications 
100 (3/00) CAPS Globalization and Sino-American Economic Relations 
101 (4月0) CPPS Govemment Expenditures and Equilibrium Real 
Exchange Rates 
J 02 (5 /00) CPPS A Case Study of Economic Ecology: The Hong Kong 
Economy' s Plunge into a Deep Recession in 1998 
103 (6/00) CPPS Jncentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic Reform 
104 (7/00) CPPS Safety Climate and Employee Health Among Blue 
Collar 九N'orkers in Hong Kong and China: Age and 0.--- ..0-...- _......-.....0 
Gender Di仟erences
105 (8/00) CPPS The Political Economy of Hong Kong SAR's Fiscal 
Policy 
Author 
Dr. Oi-ling Siu, 
Professor Paul E. Spector, 
Professor Cary L. Cooper, 
D r. Luo Lu and 
Dr. Shanfa Yu 
」un qa n 戶LWρLW Fh 
FU --J AU TE a w 臼品，且
-J
Og-sn ea
.', 
hp OP-b
趴
Dr. Samiran Banerjee and 
Dr. Ping Lin 
Dr. Yue Ma and 
Dr. Angelos Kanas 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Dr. Oi-ling Siu and 
Dr. Kui-yin Cheung 
a m ' .... LK HU Vd O VZ H ra D 
Dr. Hiroyuki lmai 
Dr. Wong Yiu-chung and 
D r. Chan Che-po 
Professor C. Fred Bergsten 
Professor Ronald J. Balvers and 
Dr. Jeffrey H . Bergstrand 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Dr. Chengze Simon Fan and 
Professor Herschel l. Grossman 
Dr. Oi-ling Siu, Dr. Ian Dona肘，
Professor David R. Phi l1 ips and 
Mr. Bilty Kwok-hllng She 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
No. 主盟k Author 
106 (9/00) CPPS A Two-wave Trend Study ofOrganizational Climate Dr. Oi- ling Siu 
and P舟Ichologica l Distress among GeneraJ and 
Psychiatric Nurses in Hong Kong 
107 (1 /01) CPPS Realist ic Exchange Rates: A Post-Asian Financial Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Crisis Perspective 
108 (2/01) CPPS Health Care Financing and Delivery in Hong Kong: Professor Lok-sang Ho 
抗'hat Shou ld Be Done 
109 (3/01) CPPS The World Currency Uni t: Can it Work? Professor Lok-sang Ho 
110 (4/01) CPPS Strategic Spin-Offs Dr. Ping Lin 
111 (5 /01) CPPS DowllstreaOl R&D. Raising Rivals ' Costs, and Input Dr. Samiran Banerjee and 
Price Contract Dr. Ping Lin 
112 (6 /01) CPPS Ecology and Foreign Policy: Theoretical Lessons from Dr. John 8arkdu l1 and 
the Literature Dr. Paul G. Harris 
113 (7/0 1)CPPS Evo lving Norms ofNorth-South Ass istance: Will They Dr. Paul G. Harris and 
be Appl ied to HIV/AIDS? Dr. Patricia Siplon 
114 (8/01) CPPS “One Country, T\\'o Systems" in Pract ice: An Analysis Dr. Wong Yiu-chung 
ofSix Cases 
1 1 5 (9.'01) CA PS 中圖自由貿易區的構想-WTO框架下中國大陸與 還福林教授
港、澳、台經賀閱{芽、展望
116 (10.'01) CAPS Economic Refonns and Growth Prospects in India Professor Lawrence R. Kiein and 
Dr. Thangavel Palanivel 
117 ( 1/02) CAPS 加入 WTO對台灣製造業的衝擊微觀分析 陳信宏博士、史惠慈博士
118 (2心2) CAPS 中國大陸加入世貿組織對大陸經濟發展之影響 田君美博士
119 (3 '02) CAPS 入世後瓊台農業項下自由質易展望 李昌邦教授
120 (4 '02)CAPS 兩岸入世貿後智慧財產權爭議解決之探討 王琇慧女士
121 (5102) CAPS 台灣入世銀行服務業在法規和政策上之調適 王應傑先生
122 (6 '02) CAPS 加入 WTO對台灣與大陸證券業之衝擊與國應 吳桂燕博士
123 (7.02) CAPS 兩岸工業部門國際分工程度之比較分析 吳中峻博士
124 (S02) CAPS 兩岸入研7後的金融新情勢 薛f奇教授
125 (9 ÎJ2) CA PS I!.!:貿組織與章，易相關投資措施協定與跨國投資之 王泰銓教授 、 楊士慧女士
j:也定問題
No. 巨型~ Author 
126 (10102) CAPS 中國大陸個入 WTO後政府職能之變遷.調迫與挑戰 陳德昇博士
127 (11 /02) CPPS Competition Policy l1 nder Laissez-faireism: Market Professor Edward K. Y 
PO叭'er and Its Treatment in Hong Kong Chen and Or. Ping Lin 
128 (12102) CPPS R&O in China and the Implications for Industrial Dr. Ping Lin 
Restructuring 
129 (13 /02) CPPS Edllcation Reform: An Economic Perspective Professor Lok Sang Ho 
130 (14 /02) CAPS 00 China and Hong Kong Constitllte An Optimllm Or. Ylle Ma and Professor 
Currency Area? Shll-ki Tsang 
131 (15/02) CAPS Dirty Coal: Volllntary International Environ ll1ental Palll G. Harris and Chihiro 
Agreements and SlIstainable Oevelopment in the Udagawa 
People's Republic ofChina 
A flllllist ofworking papers titles is al50 available at the Centre homepages 
hll{J . .//www. LNedll.hklcaps/ andhltp:!lw lI.w. LNedu.hk/cpps/ 
香港屯門
嶺爾大學
人文及社會科學研究所
亞洲太平洋研究中心
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 
Institute of HumahÌ也es and Social Sciences 
Lingnan U niversity 
Tuen Mun, Hong K.ong 
Tel: (852) 2616 7180 
Fax: (852) 2465 5786 
